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COMMENTS
Double Jeopardy and the Identity of Offenses
The maxim "nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of
life or liberty for the same offense" is incorporated into Article
I, Section 9, of the Louisiana Constitution.' (Emphasis added.)
Although the phraseology may differ,2 this maxim is accepted in
all federal8 and state4 courts. The underlying theory supporting
the immunity from more than one prosecution for the same of-
fense is the belief that repeated prosecutions result in persecu-
tion by the state. The wisdom of the guarantee against double
jeopardy is not questioned, but the precise meaning of the
maxim, particularly the scope of the term "same offense," has
been at issue with diversity of opinion since its beginning before
the common law. 5 A variety of criteria are employed with a re-
sulting discrepancy in the degree of protection afforded. To il-
lustrate, a New Jersey court concluded that where a defendant
ignited a building and in the resulting fire a victim was fatally
burned, a prosecution for arson barred a subsequent prosecution
for murder because both offenses emanated from the same crim-
inal transaction. Compare, however, the approach taken by the
United States Supreme Court in Ebeling v. Morgan.7 There sep-
arate convictions were upheld where a defendant cut into and
opened six mail sacks with the intent to rob. Each successive
entry into a different mail sack resulted in a separate robbery
1. LA, CONST. art. I, § 9. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. art. 274 (1928) provides:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense."
2. E.g., it is sometimes phrased that a person shall not be twice placed in
jeopardy of life or limb and one construction placed thereon has been that the
constitutional prohibition is limited to offenses punishable as felonies. BEALE,
CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 67 (1899).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This provision applies
only to proceedings in federal courts. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377
(1922).
4. It is applied through either constitutional provisions, statutes, or as a
part of the general body of common law applicable within the state. 1 BISHOP,
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 980-981 (9th ed. 1923). In Holt v. State, 160 Tenn. 366, 371,
24 S.W.2d 886, 887 (1929), the court observed that "[wihile the words of the
Constitution confine the guarantee to cases involving life or limb, underlying
principles of the common law go beyond, and where the protection against second
jeopardy is not given by the Constitution, it is secured by the common law."
5. Ibid. The doctrine was expressed in the Magna Charta and followed by
common law courts. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). In State
v. Yokum, 155 La. 846, 874, 99 So. 621, 631 (1924), the court declared: "While
the doctrine that no one shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense has
always been embedded in the common law of England, as well as the Roman law,
'Nemo bis punitur pro eodem delicto,' it is impossible to trace the doctrine to any
distinct origin, as it is part of the universal law of reason, justice, and conscience."
6. State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 25 Am. Dec. 490 (1833).
7. 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
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offense. These two decisions, the first affording a maximum of
protection and the second a minimum, can be explained only by
their employment of different tests for determining what is the
"same offense."
Before considering the several tests used by Louisiana and
other jurisdictions in determining double jeopardy, it is neces-
sary to define and distinguish certain terms. Initially, a dis-
tinction is drawn between acts, transactions, and the criminal
offense which attaches to legally proscribed conduct. A single
act may result in the commission of several crimes. For ex-
ample, A, entrusted with B's cotton, represents himself as the
owner to C, who purchases the cotton. Here, A has, in a single
act, committed theft of (embezzled) B's cotton and also com-
mitted theft of (obtained by false pretenses) C's money.8 Al-
though A has performed only one physical act, he has committed
two separate and distinct thefts from different persons. A closer
case is presented where there is only a single injury to one
victim. For example, an act of sexual intercourse with a child
under the age of twelve and related to the offender in the second
degree of consanguinity will result in the commission of the
distinct crimes of aggravated rape 9 and incest.10 Moreover, this
one act has violated several statutes proscribing offenses affect-
ing the public morals, particularly those relating to juveniles."
A continuous, unlawful transaction will often result in the com-
mission of several crimes. For example, a defendant enters a
grocery store bent on robbery and kills two persons in successive
order. A Louisiana court found this, while being a single trans-
action, to be two distinct criminal homicides and, thus, convic-
tion for one did not bar subsequent prosecution for the other.' 2
Similarly, it has been held that a gambler, participating in
seventy-five hands of poker at one sitting, commits a separate
prosecutable offense by playing each hand. 8
TESTS OF IDENTITY AT COMMON LAW
A majority of jurisdictions apply the so-called "same evi-
dence" test or a variation thereon. As originally stated in
8. State v. Faulkner, 39 La. Ann. 811, 2 So. 539 (1887). See LA. R.S. 14:67
(1950), and comments following.
9. LA. R.S. 14:41, 42 (1950).
10. Id. 14:78.
11. E.g., id. 14:92, 81, and accompanying comments.
12. State v. Roberts, 170 La. 727, 129 So. 144 (1930).
13. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
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The King v. Vandercomb and Abbott,14 "unless the first indict-
ment were such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon
by proof of the facts contained in the second indictment, an
acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the second."
That is, the defendant is not being twice placed in jeopardy for
the same offense. The "same evidence" inquiry purports to
shield the defendant from the risk of being prosecuted for a
lesser or included offense and, subsequently, for the greater or
major offense. In other words, it insures against a splitting
of the offense to facilitate multiple prosecutions. 15 But, where
the first indictment requires proof of an element not necessary
for conviction on the second indictment, multiple prosecutions
for seemingly the same offense have been permitted.' Some
jurisdictions apply the "same evidence" test in reverse so as to
question whether evidence necessary to support the first in-
dictment would have sustained a conviction of the offense
charged in the second indictment. 17 Still other jurisdictions
apply the test both ways and inquire into whether the evidence
necessary to support either indictment would have sustained
a conviction for the offense charged in the other indictment.' s
The "same evidence" test works an injustice when applied to a
situation where seventy-five hands of poker are played at one
sitting. A Kentucky court stated that a separate prosecution
would be allowed for each hand because evidence necessary to
14. 2 Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (1796).
15. The test has been variously stated. E.g., "If the evidence which is necessary
to support the second indictment was admissible under the former, was related to
the same crime and was sufficient if believed by the jury to have warranted a
conviction of that crime, the offenses are identical, but if the facts which will
convict on the second prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on the
first, the first will not be a bar." Medlock v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 718, 720,
288 S.W. 670, 671 (1926).
16. E.g., Hall v. State, 134 Ala. 90, 32 So. 750 (1902) (for a single act of sexual
intercourse, prosecutions for both rape and seduction were allowed because con-
viction for either crime required proof of one or more elements not required for
conviction of the other crime); State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18 So.2d 478
(1944) (for a single act of sexual intercourse, prosecutions for both rape and
unlawful carnal intercourse with an unmarried female of previous chaste character
under the age of 18 years were upheld because the elements of lack of consent
and force were not necessary proofs for conviction of the latter offense) ; State
v. Jacobson, 197 Iowa 547, 197 N.W. 638 (1924) (two prosecutions allowed,
one for assault with intent to commit rape, the other for lewd, immoral, and
lascivious acts with a child). See Rodrigues v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.2d 500,
165 P.2d 1 (1946) ; State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50 (1914).
17. Price v. State, 78 Ga. 108, 45 S.E.2d 84 (1947) ; State v. Brownrigg, 87
Me. 500, 33 Atl. 11 (1895).
18. E.g., Medlock v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 718, 288 S.W. 670 (1926);
State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 512 (1954) ; State v. Shoopman,
11 N.J. 333, 94 A.2d 493 (1953) ; Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682, 274 P.2d 630
(1954) ; Huffman v. Smith, 34 Wash.2d 914, 210 P.2d 805 (1949).
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support an indictment for playing one hand would not be suf-
ficient to procure a conviction for playing any other hand at
the same sitting.19 Moreover, this test presents the question of
whether the evidence on the second indictment means only the
necessary proofs to sustain a conviction under that indictment,
all of the allegations contained in the indictment, or all of the
evidence to be introduced in the second prosecution. It would
appear that under a proper application of the test, evidence
supporting the second indictment does not mean all of the facts
which might have been alleged, rather it should include only
the essential facts to support the indictment, i.e., to sustain a
conviction for the last charged offense.2 0 Otherwise, the plea
could conceivably be determined by the existence of surplusage
in the alleged facts.
A minority of jurisdictions look to the criminal transaction
giving rise to the several offenses and conclude that where
multiple crimes result from a single transaction, the state is
allowed to prosecute for only one of the crimes committed.'
This inquiry concerns the physical transaction of the defendant
rather than the resulting crimes, any number of which may be
composed of elements uncommon to the other resulting crimes. 22
The leading case of State v. Cooper25 is illustrative of this ap-
proach. There, the defendant ignited a building in which a
victim was fatally burned. The New Jersey court disallowed a
prosecution for murder following an earlier prosecution for
arson. Some jurisdictions have applied the "same transaction"
test when the "same evidence" test appeared to render harsh
results. 24 Still other jurisdictions have used the two tests inter-
changeably. 25
19. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
20. See Note, 40 YALE L.J. 462 (1931).
21. Trawick v. Birmingham, 23 Ala. App. 308, 125 So. 211 (1929) ; Ruffin
v. State, 29 Ga. App. 214, 114 S.E. 581 (1922) ; Mullins v. Commonwealth, 216
Ky. 182, 286 S.W. 1042 (1926) ; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 N.W. 1119
(1890) ; Beaman v. State, 69 Okla. Cr. 455, 104 P.2d 260 (1940) ; Whitten v.
State, 94 Tex. Cr. Rep. 144, 250 S.W. 165 (1923) ; State v. Houchins, 102 W.Va.
169, 134 S.E. 740 (1926).
22. "These courts proceed upon the theory that a single physical act can be
the basis of only one offense, and the practical effect of this theory is to interpret
'same offense' in the double jeopardy prohibition as 'same transaction.' " Comment,
19 IowA. L. REV. 596, 597 (1934).
23. 13 N.J.L. 361, 25 Am. Dec. 490 (1833).
24. Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8, 58 Am. Dec. 528 (1853) (defendant convicted
of burglary and subsequently prosecuted for robbery. The court discussed the
''same evidence" test and then used the "same transaction" test to uphold a plea
of double jeopardy).
25. Estep v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 103, 143 Pac. 64 (1914) ; Barton v. State,
26 Okla. Cr. 150, 222 Pac. 1019 (1924) ; Hochderffer v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 215,
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Some courts determine double jeopardy on the basis of de-
grees of the offenses. Where the first prosecution was for an
element of or the whole of the offense charged in the second
indictment, the defendant is being twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.26 This has been termed the "essential element"
test.
TESTS OF IDENTITY IN LOUISIANA
Separate Prosecutions for one Act; Same Transaction
In an early Louisiana case, State v. Cheevers,27 the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated that a person shall not be "punished twice
for the same criminal act" (as distinguished from the same
criminal offense). There, the defendant was prosecuted under
separate indictments, first for assault and battery and subse-
quently for maiming. In upholding the plea of double jeopardy,
the court did not elaborate on the possibility of multiple crimes
arising from a single act. But, several years later, in State v.
Faulkner,28 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "It has been
held, in numerous case, that where a particular act is of such
a character as to constitute two distinct crimes, conviction for
one will not bar prosecution for the other .. .though both of-
fenses arise out of the same act. ' 29 (Emphasis added.) It ap-
pears that Cheevers has not been followed in subsequent Louisi-
ana cases, and the courts have adopted the approach taken in
Faulkner30
Moreover, Louisiana courts have not accepted the "same
transaction" test as illustrated by the approach taken in State
v. Leslie.8 1 There the defendant was charged with several per-
sonal injury crimes arising from a "general family row," and
245 Pac. 902 (1926) ; Worley v. State, 42 Okla. Cr. 240, 275 Pac. 399 (1929) ;
King v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 411, 121 P.2d 1021 (1942) ; Beaman v. State, 69
Okla. Cr. 455, 104 P.2d 260 (1940). These cases vacillate between "same evidence"
and "same transaction" tests. See Comment, 8 OKLA. L. REV. 223 (1955).
26. Gladden v. State, 24 Ala. App. 188, 132 So. 435 (1931) ; Sanford v. State,
75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918) ; Usary v. State, 172 Tenn. 305, 112 S.W.2d 7
(1937). See Note, 2 DE PAUL L. REV. 263, 266 (1953) for discussion of decisions
determining double jeopardy on the basis of degrees of offenses.
27. 7 La. Ann. 40, 41 (1852).
28. 39 La. Ann. 811, 2 So. 539 (1887).
29. Id. at 812, 2 So. at 540.
30. State v. Calvo, 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960) ; State v. Montcrieffe,
165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928). See Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy,
30 TuL. L. REV. 409 (1956). But see State v. Augustine, 29 La. Ann. 119 (1877),
where the court reverted to the language expressed in Cheevers.
31. 167 La. 967, 120 So. 614 (1929).
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the court observed: "The several offenses grew out of the same
difficulty and were so closely linked and connected as to form a
single transaction. . . . It is a well settled rule of law that a
person may commit separate and distinct crimes at the same
time or in immediate connection and be indicted for each of said
crimes. '8 2 This view is expressed throughout later Louisiana
casesA8
The "Same Evidence" Test
As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
Foster,8 4 the "same evidence" test in Louisiana questions
"whether the evidence necessary to support the second indict-
ment would have been sufficient to have procured a legal convic-
tion on the first."8 5 As thus phrased, it appears that Louisiana
courts would follow the view that evidence on the second indict-
ment means only that evidence necessary to sustain a conviction
and not all of the allegations contained in the indictment, or all
of the evidence to be introduced in the second prosecution.36 It
is noted, however, that the issue has never been clearly raised
so as to afford a definitive explanation of what evidence the
test as applied in Louisiana contemplates. In State v. Barrett,8 7
because the statute required proof of an additional element for
conviction on the first indictment, two prosecutions were upheld,
the first for forgery and the second for publishing a forged in-
strument. Also because of an additional element required for
conviction under the first indictment, even where both offenses
arise from a single transaction, the "same evidence" test will
allow separate prosecutions for attempted arson and assault
32. Id. at 972, 120 So. at 615.
33. State v. Calvo, 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960) ; State v. Montcrieffe,
165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928) ; State v. Roberts, 152 La. 283, 93 So. 95 (1922) ;
State v. Hill, 122 La. 711, 48 So. 160 (1909) ; State v. Barrett, 121 La. 1058, 46
So. 1016 (1908). The foregoing cases evidence the refusal of the courts to apply
the "same transaction" test in Louisiana. The distinction between single and
separate transactions has been made, however, although the "same transaction"
test was not applied. State v. Lopez, 169 La. 247, 125 So. 65 (1929) ; State v.
Weeden, 164 La. 713, 114 So. 604 (1927) ; State v. Xenos, 138 La. 113, 70 So. 55
(1915) ; State v. Anderson, 135 La. 326, 65 So. 478 (1914) ; State v. Heard, 107
La. 60, 31 So. 384 (1902). A determination of whether the several offenses arose
out of a single act or transaction is often necessary for purposes of ascertaining
the number of indictments permissible.
34. 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924).
35. Id. at 897, 101 So. at 258.
36. Numerous charges in Louisiana may be included in so-called "short-form
indictments" which do not contain specific factual allegations, and it is suggested
that evidence under such indictments should include only those elements necessary
to sustain a conviction for the crime charged. See Note, 40 YALE L.J. 462 (1931).
37. 121 La. 1058, 46 So. 1016 (1908).
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and battery ;38 larceny and burglary ;39 cattle stealing and carry-
ing a concealed weapon ;40 manufacturing, selling and disposing
of liquor and possession of liquor ;41 prohibited sale of beer to
one person and prohibited sale of liquor to another ;42 obtaining
one person's money by false pretenses (theft) and embezzling
another's cotton (theft) ;43 successive murders of different per-
sons ;44 and assault and battery upon different persons.
45
The "Responsive Verdict" Test
In State v. Foste4 6 a second criterion was used to determine
whether the defendant was being twice tried for the same of-
fense. This test supplements the "same evidence" test and ques-
tions "whether on the former trial the accused could have been
convicted of the crime charged against him on the second trial.
47
This is essentially a question of whether a verdict of guilty of
the crime charged in the second indictment would have been
responsive to the first indictment.48 If so, and if the court in
the first trial had jurisdiction to render the verdict, the de-
fendant is being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense.
In Foster, the defendant could not have been convicted of assault
and battery in the first trial for attempted arson and, therefore,
the "responsive verdict" test proved unavailing in the attempt
to establish double jeopardy. In a 1960 case, State v. Calvo,49
the defendants were first prosecuted for murder predicated upon
the felony-murder doctrine 0 and, subsequently, for simple rob-
bery. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that since a verdict
of guilty of simple robbery would not have been responsive to
the indictment for murder in the first prosecution, the defend-
38. State V. Foster, 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924).
39. State v. Shaw, 5 La. Ann. 342 (1850).
40. State v. Lopez, 169 La. 247, 125 So. 65 (1929).
41. State v. Yokum, 155 La. 846, 99 So. 621 (1924).
42. State v. Heard, 170 La. 60, 31 So. 384 (1902).
43. State v. Faulkner, 39 La. Ann. 811, 2 So. 539 (1887).
44. State v. Vines, 34 La. Ann. 1079 (1882).
45. State v. Ysasi, 222 La. 902, 64 So.2d 213 (1953).
46. 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924).
47. Id. at 898, 101 So. at 258. This test had been applied in earlier cases. See
State v. Hill, 122 La. 711, 48 So. 160 (1909). In State v. Terry, 128 La. 680,
683, 55 So. 15, 16 (1911), the court stated: "The test of once in jeopardy is
whether on the former trial the accused could have been convicted of the crime
charged against him on the second trial."
48. LA. R.S. 15:386 (1950) provides responsive verdicts for numerous indict-
ments. However, this article does not cover all offenses. In such cases, Articles
405 and 406 apply.
49. 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960).
50. It was alleged by the prosecution that the killing resulted from the perpe-
tration or attempted perpetration of simple robbery upon the victim.
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ants were not being twice placed in jeopardy for the same of-
fense.5 1
The "Substantial Identity" Test
A third formula for determining the identity of offenses was
discussed in State v. Foster. The court observed: "While formal,
technical, and absolute identity of the offenses is not necessary,
yet substantial identity is an essential element. ' 5 2 This reasoning
was used in finding a lack of substantial identity between at-
tempted arson and assault and battery. It was stated that the
existence of overlapping elements between the several crimes
does not render the offenses substantially identical. Louisiana
courts have found that substantial identity does not exist be-
tween the crimes of burglary and larceny ;1 separate murders
in successive order ;54 nor between the selling of beer illegally
to one person and whiskey illegally to another.5 5 The inquiry
into substantial identity does not appear to be an independent
test of what constitutes double jeopardy for the same offense
and the courts have not supplied any definite criteria for making
the determination. It is suggested that a finding of "substan-
tial identity" is nothing more or less than a showing that the
"same evidence" and "responsive verdict" tests render a conclu-
sion favorable to the defendant's plea.
Article 279, Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
A legislative determination of what constitutes a second
prosecution for the same offense was adopted in 1928 and is
contained in Article 279 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure.5" It is provided that for double jeopardy to result,
the charges must be either (1) identical, (2) different grades
of the same offense, or (3) such that one offense is necessarily
included in the other. Notwithstanding the statutory criteria
of Article 279, the Foster case is still being relied upon5 7 and it
appears that the courts consider Article 279 to be a codification
51. LA. R.S. 15:386 (1950) provides that only the following verdicts are re-
sponsive to a murder indictment: (1) guilty as charged, (2) guilty without cap-
ital punishment, (3) guilty of manslaughter, and (4) not guilty.
52. State v. Foster, 156 La. 891, 897, 101 So. 255, 258 (1924).
53. State v. Fradella, 164 La. 752, 114 So. 641 (1928).
54. State v. Roberts, 170 La. 727, 129 So. 144 (1930).
55. State v. Heard, 107 La. 60, 31 So. 384 (1902).
56. LA. R.S. 15:279 (1950).
57. See State v. Calvo, 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960). The court cited LA.
CODE OF CRrm. PRoc. art. 279 (1928) and proceeded to discuss the tests used in
Foster in reaching its decision. See also State v. Ysasi, 222 La. 902, 64 So.2d 213
(1953).
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of the prior existing law on identity of offenses. Generally, the
court-announced tests will lead to the same conclusion as will
an application of Article 279. To illustrate, Article 279 provides
that double jeopardy results when both charges are based on
"different grades of the same offense" or where "one offense is
necessarily included in the other." The "same evidence" test
will, in some cases, lead to the same conclusion. Where the most
serious form of a graded offense is charged in the second indict-
ment, and the first indictment is based upon a lesser grade of
the same offense, the objectionable result envisoned by the
"same evidence" test and Article 279 is reached. Both the court
test and Article 279 will prevent two prosecutions in this situa-
tion.18 Similarly, where a necessarily included offense (although
not always a lesser grade of the same offense) is charged in the
first indictment, and the second indictment is based on the
major offense, the "same evidence" test will render the same
results as will an application of Article 279. Here, evidence
necessary to prove commission of the major offense charged
in the second indictment will, perforce, be sufficient to obtain
a legal conviction on the necessarily included offense charged
in the first indictment. This is because all of the elements of the
necesarily included offense are included within the definition of
the major offense.59
Where the prosecution attempts to split an offense into sev-
eral lesser offenses by charging the major or completed crime
in the first indictment, and the lesser or included offense (s) in
a second indictment, Article 279 provides that this will amount
to double jeopardy. The "responsive verdict" test will lead to
the same conclusion if the court in the first trial had jurisdic-
tion to render a verdict on the crime charged in the second in-
dictment.0o
58. E.g., A is prosecuted for simple robbery and jeopardy attaches; subse-
quently A is prosecuted for armed robbery upon the same facts and he pleads
double jeopardy for the same offense. The charges are clearly based on different
grades of the same offense, i.e., robbery. Also, evidence necessary to support the
second indictment (for armed robbery) would have been sufficient to have pro-
cured a legal conviction on the first (for simple robbery). See LA. R.S. 14:64,
65 (1950). See also id. 14:5.
59. E.g., A is prosecuted for simple assault and jeopardy attaches; subsequent-
ly A is prosecuted for aggravated battery upon the same facts and he pleads doublejeopardy for the same offense. The charges are clearly such that one offense is
necessarily included in the other, i.e., simple assault is included in aggravated
battery. Also, evidence necessary to support the second indictment (for aggra-
vated battery) would have been sufficient to have procured a legal conviction on
the first (for simple assault). See id. 14:34, 36, 38. See also id. 14:5.
60. E.g., A is prosecuted for aggravated arson and jeopardy attaches; subse-
quently A is prosecuted for simple arson upon the same facts and he pleads double
1961]
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Although the statutory criteria and court tests for deter-
mining the identity of offenses will usually achieve the same
result, there are situations where dissimilar conclusions may be
forthcoming. For example, the defendant commits a criminal
homicide and is prosecuted and acquitted for murder. Subse-
quently, the defendant is indicted and tried for negligent homi-
cide and he pleads double jeopardy for the same offense. This
plea would be properly overruled under an application of both
the "same evidence" and "responsive verdict" tests. Evidence
necessary to support the second indictment charging negligent
homicide would not have been sufficient to have procured a legal
conviction on the first indictment charging murder.0 1 Moreover,
on the former trial for murder the accused could not have been
convicted of the crime charged against him on the second, negli-
gent homicide. This is because a verdict of guilty of negligent
homicide is not responsive to an indictment for murder.0 2  Prior
to adoption of Louisiana's Responsive Verdict Statute6 3 in 1948,
a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide was responsive to in-
dictments for murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide.
6 4
jeopardy for the same offense. The charges are clearly based on different grades
of the same offense, i.e., arson. Also, on the former trial for aggravated arson the
defendant could have been convicted of the crime charged against him on the
second (simple arson). See id. 14:51, 52. Id. 15:386 provides that a verdict of
guilty of simple arson is responsive to an indictment for aggravated arson. See
also id. 14:5.
61. See id. 14:30, 32.
62. Louisiana's 1948 Responsive Verdict Statute, id. 15:386, enumerates those
verdicts responsive to a murder indictment. They are (1) guilty as charged, (2)
guilty without capital punishment, (3) guilty of manslaughter, and (4) not guilty.
Neither is a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide responsive to an indictment
for manslaughter. Thus, the same conclusion would be reached had the defendant
been first prosecuted for manslaughter and subsequently for negligent homicide.
In State v. Neal, 169 La. 441, 125 So. 442 (1929), it was stated that a prosecu-
tion for a lesser and included offense will not be barred by a former acquittal for
the greater offense if the court in the first trial lacked jurisdiction to render aj
verdict on the lesser and included offense.
63. Id. 15:386. This legislation does not attempt to provide responsive verdicts
for all indictments; the criteria set out in id. 15:405, 406 is followed where the
Responsive Verdict Statute is inapplicable. In State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 620, 38
So.2d 359, 363 (1948), the court stated that "the test is whether the definition of
the greater offense necessarily includes all the elements of the lesser. Stated in
another way for practical application, this merely means that, if any reasonable
state of facts can be imagined wherein the greater offense is committed without
perpetration of the lesser offense, a verdict for the lesser cannot be responsive."
See State v. Clayton, 236 La. 1093, 110 So.2d 111 (1959) (good development of
tests for responsiveness and latest case in point) ; State v. Latiolais, 225 La. 878,
74 So.2d 148 (1954) ; State v. Roberts, 213 La. 559, 35 So.2d 216 (1948) ; Com-
ment, 5 LoUsIANA LAW REVIEW 603 (1944) ; Note, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
464, 469 (1951).
64. State v. Love, 210 La. 11, 26 So.2d 156 (1946). Under an indictment for
murder, verdicts of guilty of manslaughter or negligent homicide are responsive;
under an indictment for manslaughter, verdicts of guilty of manslaughter, not
guilty, and guilty of negligent homicide are responsive. State v. Gueringer, 209
La. 118, 24 So.2d 284 (1945).
COMMENTS
One author has suggested that due to the collateral effects of
the Responsive Verdict Statute upon the substantive law of
double jeopardy, a defendant may be prosecuted for both man-
slaughter and negligent homicide on the basis of a single criminal
homicide.65 It is submitted, however, that under an application
of Article 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this double
prosecution for a single criminal homicide would be prohibited.
To illustrate, Article 279 provides that double jeopardy results
when the two charges are based on "different grades of the same
offense." Article 29 of the Louisiana Criminal Code provides:
"Homicide is the killing of a human being by the act, procure-
ment or culpable omission of another. Criminal homicide is of
three grades: (1) Murder (2) Manslaughter (3) Negligent
homicide." 66 (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is clear that each
crime is a different grade of the same offense, 67 that offense
being criminal homicide, and Article 279 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure applies to limit the state to a prosecution for only
one of the grades. Responsive verdicts may be restricted for
reasons of public policy and the administration of justice, but
this is not to say that such changes should have a collateral
effect upon the substantive law of double jeopardy and a basic
immunity granted by the Louisiana Constitution.6 8
Another example where the "same evidence" and "responsive
verdict" tests will be fatal to the defendant's plea of double
jeopardy, although an application of Article 279 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure will not, is the case of a defendant being
first prosecuted for simple battery6 9 and, subsequently, for ag-
gravated battery.7 0 Clearly on the former trial for simple bat-
tery the defendant could not have been convicted of the crime
65. See Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy, 30 TUL. L. REV. 409, 421
(1956).
66. LA. R.S. 14:29 (1950).
67. Ibid. The reporter's comments on Article 29 say, in part, that "[M]urder,
manslaughter and negligent homicide are specifically designated as different grades
of homicide. Under an indictment for murder, verdicts of the lesser offenses of
manslaughter and negligent homicide will be proper." (Emphasis added.)
68. See Note, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 464, 470 (1951). The author con-
cludes: "However, it should be recognized that this application of the responsive
verdict statute subjects a defendant to the possibility of two trials for a single
homicide, and it may be argued that the second prosecution is contrary to the real
spirit of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Had there been a
conviction for manslaughter, surely the defendant could not have been subsequently
tried for negligent homicide. Thus it is apparent that two distinct offenses have
not been committed in the same act-either there has been manslaughter or a
negligent homicide."
69. LA. R.S. 14:35 (1950).
70. Id. 14:34.
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charged against him on the second trial (aggravated battery) .71
Moreover, evidence necessary to support the second indictment
(for aggravated battery) would not have been sufficient to have
procured a legal conviction on the first indictment (for simple
battery). The definition of simple battery requires that a bat-
tery be committed "without the consent of the victim," 72 but
consent is of no importance in a prosecution for aggravated
battery.7 8 Therefore, want of the victim's consent is not "evi-
dence necessary to support the second indictment," and this
additional element required for a conviction on the first indict-
ment will render the "same evidence" test unavailing to the
defendant. Under Article 279, however, simple battery and ag-
gravated battery should be contemplated in the phrase "dif-
ferent grades of the same offense" which will establish double
jeopardy for the same offense.7 4
CONCLUSION
Article 279 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth
three relationships between the charges which will establish
double jeopardy for the same offense. However, court-announced
tests as stated in Foster are being applied today. While the
Foster tests will lead to the same conclusion as will an applica-
tion of Article 279 in most fact situations, this is not always the
case. Louisiana's 1948 Responsive Verdict Statute may render
the "responsive verdict" test undesirable where responsive ver-
dicts have been restricted for reasons of public policy. In that
event, application of the clearer statutory formula of Article
279 will provide a sound solution and avoid any infringement
upon a basic constitutional immunity against double jeopardy for
the same offense.
John S. Campbell, Jr.
71. A verdict of guilty of aggravated battery is not responsive to an indictment
for simple battery. Id. 15:386.
72. Id. 14:35 provides: "Simple Battery is a battery, without the consent of
the victim, committed without a dangerous weapon."
73. Id. 14:34 provides: "Aggravated Battery is a battery committed with a
dangerous weapon." Id. 14:33 provides the definition of a battery: "Battery is
the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another; or the inten-
tional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another."
It is pointed out that want of the victim's consent is not a necessary element
within the definition of either offense.
74. Turn this hypothetical case around and prosecute first for aggravated bat-
tery and then for simple battery and the "responsive verdict" test will lead to the
conclusion that the defendant is being twice tried for the same offense. That is,
on the former trial (for aggravated battery) the accused could have been convicted
of the crime charged against him on the second trial (simple battery). A verdict
of guilty of simple battery is responsive to an indictment for aggravated battery.
Id. 15:386.
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